Buffett simply defines investing as “forgoing consumption now to have the ability to consume more later.” “In stating this opinion, we define risk, using dictionary terms, as ‘the possibility of loss or injury.’” (1993) Following these results is usually a discussion of how the change in intrinsic value is the metric that counts, but that book value is a conservative substitute that approximately tracks intrinsic value. Berkshire’s goal is to keep the companies operating exactly as they were before the purchase. Berkshire’s cost-free float, while carried on its books as a liability, has proven to be one of its greatest assets.

On Market Fluctuations

Comparatively, an $18 investment in the S&P 500 in 1965 would have compounded at an annual rate of 9.4% and been worth $1,343 in 2012. By 2012, that same share would trade for $134,060, compounding at an annual rate of 20.4%. In 2012, forty-eight years later, Buffett discusses his 50% purchase of a holding company that will own 100% of H.J. The letter was one page long and dealt with topics that included liquidating the assets of one textile mill and changes in Berkshire’s inventory. Stephen Foley at FT Alphaville has a great breakdown of Buffett’s letter here, which serves a great curtain raiser ahead of the 50th annual Berkshire letter.

  • As a long term investor, the durability of a competitive advantage is a key concern to Buffett.
  • When these attributes exist, and when we can make purchases at sensible prices, it is hard to go wrong.” (1994)
  • In 2012, forty-eight years later, Buffett discusses his 50% purchase of a holding company that will own 100% of H.J.
  • First, the company must have available funds (cash on hand plus sensible borrowing capacity).

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“We like a business with enduring competitive advantages that is run by able and owner-oriented people. Inherently, the risk that the investor runs is that by forgoing consumption now, he may not have the ability to consume more later. Rather, Buffett feels that real risk is not volatility, but the potential that after-tax receipts from an investment will not result in a gain in purchasing power. As discussed, Buffett does not view volatility as an adequate measure of investment risk. Thus, volatility actually works in favor of the intelligent investor because increased volatility creates increased opportunity to take advantage of even lower lows and higher highs. The investor can always use Mr. Market to his advantage as long as he understands that Mr. Market’s purpose is to serve him rather than to guide him.

If a manager is able to employ all of company earnings internally at a high rate of return that will create over $1 of market value for every $1 retained, managers should do so. In fact, if their business experience continues to satisfy us, we welcome lower market prices for stocks we own as an opportunity to acquire even more of a good thing at a competitive price.” By viewing market prices as quotes from a manic-depressive business partner, the investor is now put in a position of power over market prices rather than enslaved by them (a far-too-common occurrence). Readers of these letters are provided with an invaluable understanding of how to view markets and companies, which is exceedingly beneficial for passive investors and professionals alike. Readers gain a framework for how to view risk, markets, and investing, as well as an understanding of how truly great businesses should operate.

If these two criteria are satisfied, Buffett feels that his managers are doing their jobs and will praise them for it in the annual letter. Indeed, it is not uncommon for Berkshire’s managers to work well into old age simply because of their love for their business. Thus, Buffett and Munger do not view Berkshire to be the owner of the assets, but as a “conduit through which shareholders own the assets.” This is consistent with Buffett’s view of Berkshire not as a corporation, but as a partnership in which he and Charlie Munger are managing partners, with shareholders as owner-partners.

Demonstrated consistent earning power

First, the company must have available funds (cash on hand plus sensible borrowing capacity). Buffett does not wish to see this happen, and thus refuses to split Berkshire stock. His response is that he is attempting to attract a certain class of buyers, and that splitting the stock to make it sell more cheaply would ultimately lead to a decrease in the quality of ownership of Berkshire. Buffett is often asked why he berkshire hathaway letters to shareholders does not split the stock to make it more affordable and accessible for a larger number of people. In his view, many times the company being purchased will sell for full intrinsic value anyway, so the purchasing company must be sure to pay with an equal amount of intrinsic value on its end. In this event, the key question to Buffett is whether he can receive as much intrinsic business value as he gives.

  • Much in the same way, a durable competitive advantage can protect a business and its returns on invested capital from the threat of competition and lessen the impact of other outside forces that can cripple average businesses.
  • The entire book is paginated, and has easy-to-flip-to labels for each letter’s year.
  • As of 2012, Berkshire carried investments per share of $113,786 and non-insurance subsidiary earnings per share of $8,085.
  • Along the way, Buffett allows his shareholders tremendous insight not only into the internal affairs of Berkshire, but also into his thoughts on a vast array of material, ranging from corporate governance to dividend policy.
  • Buffett states that the best place to find true independence-“the willingness to challenge a forceful CEO when something is wrong or foolish”-is among people whose interests are aligned with shareholders.
  • In fact, if their business experience continues to satisfy us, we welcome lower market prices for stocks we own as an opportunity to acquire even more of a good thing at a competitive price.”

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Buffett contends that the true value of retained earnings lies in how effectively managers can employ them. He openly states that for investments in truly great companies, his favorite holding period is forever. Buffett humorously (but accurately) describes his investment style in his 1990 letter, when he says that “lethargy bordering on sloth remains the cornerstone of our investment style.” The answers to these three questions will allow the investor to rank all of his possible investments in different “bushes.” According to Buffett, “Aesop’s investment axiom, thus expanded and converted into dollars, is immutable. While a great manager is a tremendous asset to a company, when the company’s success is tied to his/her presence, any competitive advantage created simply cannot be durable by nature.

Just insert the correct numbers, and you can rank the attractiveness of all possible uses of capital throughout the universe.” Both of these criteria are of vital importance to Buffett’s investment decision-making, but regrettably he does not go into a great deal of detail on either subject. It applies to outlays for farms, oil royalties, bonds, stocks, lottery tickets, and manufacturing plants. This is why Buffett characterizes them as “moats” and why they are such an integral part of his long term investment decisions. Additionally, Buffett states that the criterion of durability eliminates businesses whose success depends on having a great manager. The standard of durability has served Buffett well over the years, keeping him out of the tech bubble in the late 1990s because the standard inherently eliminates companies in industries prone to rapid change.

Outstanding, shareholder-oriented management already in place

“We test the wisdom of retained earnings by assessing whether retention, over time, delivers shareholders at least $1 of market value for each $1 retained.” (1983) In later letters, he sets forth an in-depth example of how much frictional trading costs can eat away at investing returns. In his 1983 letter, he states his distaste for highly active investing, saying, “One of the ironies of the stock market is the emphasis on activity. He shuns the idea that diversification limits risk because often it requires that investors move money away from winning stocks and into companies with which they are unfamiliar.

Some argue that share repurchases serve as a means for managers to artificially boost per share earnings, but the fact of the matter is that as long as Buffett’s conditions are met, repurchases provide shareholders with a very real economic benefit with little to no downside. In his 1983 letter, Buffett makes exactly this point, saying, “Were we to split the stock or take other actions focusing on stock price rather than business value, we would attract an entering class of buyers inferior to the exiting class of sellers.” Buffett desires shareholders who intend to hold Berkshire stock for the long term, and lowering the price of Berkshire stock to make it more tradable would inherently bring in a more trigger-happy brand of owner who is more than happy to jump in and out of Berkshire stock as he/she pleases. “We will try to avoid policies that attract buyers with a short-term focus on our stock price and try to follow policies that attract informed long-term investors focusing on business values.” (1983) While this approach may be simpler and more predictable, Buffett contends that if serious thought is not put into which earnings should be retained and which should be distributed, shareholders are hurt because they are not earning an optimal (manimum) rate of return.

On Efficient Markets

While he does admit that the market is often efficient, Buffett believes that inefficiencies exist in the market that can be exploited through careful analysis. “Observing correctly that the market was frequently efficient, they went on to conclude that it was always efficient. In his 2012 letter, Buffett reaffirms these sentiments by saying, “Indeed, disciplined repurchases are the surest way to use funds intelligently. When these two criteria are met, Buffett is a strong proponent of corporate share repurchases.

As long as Berkshire’s managers continue to think like owners and manage their companies as if the companies are the only assets that they own, Berkshire shareholders can be confident that these outstanding results are likely to continue. His views on the tone and content of his correspondence are summarized in his 1979 letter, when he explains to his shareholders that he does not “expect a public relations document when our operating managers tell us what is going on, and we don’t feel you should receive such a document.” Buffett relates this point nicely in his 1977 letter, when he states that he finds “nothing particularly noteworthy in a management performance combining, say, a 10% increase in equity capital and a 5% increase in earnings per share. For example, a stock that has dropped very sharply compared to the market-as had the Washington Post when we bought it in 1973-becomes ‘riskier’ at the lower price than it was at a higher price.”

Unique and Useful Gifts for Book Lovers

As an aid in calculating its intrinsic value, each year Berkshire reports its investments per share and non-insurance subsidiary earnings per share. Berkshire has a policy of acquiring companies and leaving the existing management in place, which allows Berkshire to be the “destination of choice” for owners who do not wish to see their company levered up and sold for a profit. Along the way, Buffett shares with his stockholders great insight into the reasoning behind every acquisition and major investment made and provides a highly detailed historical account of Berkshire Hathaway’s growth. In 1965, Warren Buffett penned his first annual letter to the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway. And while Berkshire Hathaway is now a publicly traded company with a market cap over $330 billion — and Class A shares worth $222,850 per share — 50 years ago, Buffett was worried about getting too big.

The use of beta as a measure of risk can cause an investor to miss out on great opportunities in the market.

Managers should structure their dividend policy so that they retain only the earnings that can be reinvested at a high enough rate of return to create over $1 of market value and distribute the remaining earnings as dividends. Brokers, using terms such as ‘marketable’ and ‘liquidity’, sing the praises of companies with high share turnover (those who cannot fill your pocket will confidently fill your ear). With regard to his policy of concentrating his holdings, Buffett states that he feels that his risk is actually reduced by investing in companies with which he is familiar and fairly certain of their long term prospects. The purpose of the durable competitive advantage is not to boost growth or expected future earnings, but rather to ensure that a company’s current level of profitability can be maintained in the future through adverse events that may occur along the way. Buffett encourages “moat-widening” actions from his operating managers and actively seeks to invest in businesses possessing a durable competitive advantage, such as Coca-Cola and Gillette. Much in the same way, a durable competitive advantage can protect a business and its returns on invested capital from the threat of competition and lessen the impact of other outside forces that can cripple average businesses.

These directors are incentivized to stay on the board, which often means choosing not to offend a CEO or fellow directors so that his popularity with management can remain strong and he can continue to collect directors’ fees. In fact, being a major, long-term shareholder is one of the primary qualities that Buffett takes into account when searching for directors. When this happens, directors who are not content with the quality of management or fear that management is becoming too greedy can go directly to the owner and report their dissatisfaction. In his 1993 letter, Buffett lays out the three “boardroom situations” in great detail. He goes on to state that he is actually grateful to the academics professing the Efficient Market Hypothesis as gospel, saying, “In any sort of a contest – financial, mental, or physical – it’s an enormous advantage to have opponents who have been taught that it’s useless to even try.” Speaking on a 63-year record built at Graham-Newman Corp., Buffett Partnership, and Berkshire Hathaway during which he averaged an unleveraged annual return of over 20%, he states that his experiences provide a fair test.

When an investor intends to invest over the long term, he must be assured that the companies in which he invests will continue to operate over the long term as well. This is because an enlarged capital base from retaining earnings can produce “record” earnings yearly even if management does not employ capital any more effectively than it did in the past. This marks an area where Buffett diverges a bit from Graham, who searched for stocks selling in the market for below the value of their net tangible assets (a practice that makes sense given the context – these stocks were easy to find in 1934, immediately following the Great Depression). When these attributes exist, and when we can make purchases at sensible prices, it is hard to go wrong.” (1994)